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RESUMO/ABSTRACT 
 
Returns to Schooling in a Dynamic Model 
 
 
The paper develops a dynamic approach to Mincer equations. It is shown that a 
static model is based on the restrictive hypotheses that the total return to 
schooling is constant over the working life and independent of bargaining 
issues. A dynamic approach allows to show that the total return to schooling of 
a new labor-market entrant positively depends on his/her bargaining power as 
employee; the total return increases at a decreasing rate in the first part of the 
working life and depends of bargaining issues; afterwards it becomes roughly 
constant and independent of bargaining. The main implication is that a static 
model may produce distorted empirical results when using data on young 
workers since unable to account for the pattern of the total return to schooling in 
the first part of the working life. I show the latter using data from the U.S. 
National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1980-1987) and analyzing the impact of 
education on within-group wage inequality a la Martins and Pereira (2004a). 
However, a static model does not produce distorted empirical results when 
using data on relatively experienced workers. I show the latter using Portuguese 
data from the European Community Household Panel (1994-2001). 
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ABSTRACT 
The paper develops a dynamic approach to Mincer equations. It is shown that a static 
model is based on the restrictive hypotheses that the total return to schooling is 
constant over the working life and independent of bargaining issues. A dynamic 
approach allows to show that the total return to schooling of a new labor-market 
entrant positively depends on his/her bargaining power as employee; the total return 
increases at a decreasing rate in the first part of the working life and depends of 
bargaining issues; afterwards it becomes roughly constant and independent of 
bargaining. The main implication is that a static model may produce distorted 
empirical results when using data on young workers since unable to account for the 
pattern of the total return to schooling in the first part of the working life. I show the 
latter using data from the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1980-1987) 
and analyzing the impact of education on within-group wage inequality a la Martins 
and Pereira (2004a). However, a static model does not produce distorted empirical 
results when using data on relatively experienced workers. I show the latter using 
Portuguese data from the European Community Household Panel (1994-2001). 
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1. Introduction  
The paper develops a dynamic approach to Mincer equations. I will argue that a static model 
is based on the restrictive hypotheses that the total return to schooling is constant over the 
working life and independent of bargaining issues. A dynamic approach allows to show that 
the total return to schooling of a new labor-market entrant positively depends on his/her 
bargaining power as employee; the total return increases at a decreasing rate in the first part of 
the working life and depends of bargaining issues; afterwards it becomes roughly constant and 
independent of bargaining. The main implication is that a static model may produce distorted 
empirical results when using data on young workers since unable to account for the pattern of 
the total return to schooling in the first part of the working life. I will show the latter using 
data from the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1980-1987) and analyzing the 
impact of education on within-group wage inequality a la Martins and Pereira (2004a). 
However, a static model does not produce distorted empirical results when using data on more 
experienced workers. I will show the latter using Portuguese data from the European 
Community Household Panel (1994-2001).  
The reminder of the paper is as follows. Section 2 briefly describes some common features of 
the literature using human-capital regressions. Section 3 describes the theory behind a static 
Mincer equation. Section 4 develops a theory for a dynamic Mincer equation. Section 5 
presents empirical models. Sections 6 and 7 present estimation results. Section 8 deals with 
implications of model specification and data. Section 9 concludes the manuscript.      
 
2. Related literature 
Building on Mincer (1974), several studies have estimated the following wage equation: 
  
(1) t2t zzswln ε+φ+δ+β+α=  
 
where wln represents the logarithm of hourly earnings, s is schooling years, z is labor market 
experience and ε  is an error term. Most of existing studies share three common features:  
• the estimated models have a static nature (i.e. they do not allow for at least one lagged 
value of the dependent variable as additional regressor);  
• the estimated coefficient of education is dependent on number and type of explanatory 
variables added to model (1) 1 (see Martins and Pereira, 2004b);  
• estimation is generally based on ordinary least squares, instrumental variables, random 
effects.  
In this paper, I attempt to do a step onwards with respect to the current “state of the art”. The 
aim of this paper is to study returns to schooling in a dynamic framework.  From an empirical 
point of view, this mainly involves keeping the autoregressive nature of earnings into account. 
In doing so, I also deal with the problem of choosing “control-regressors” by replacing the 
whole set of explanatory variables suitable to be added to model (1) with one lagged value of 
earnings (this approach may be extended to more than one lag). Finally, building on Martins 
and Pereira (2004a), I take a quantile regression approach. From a theoretical point of view, 
the transition from a static to a dynamic model involves re-thinking the theory behind the 
standard Mincer equation (1), allowing for bargaining issues to play a more important role.  
 
                                                
1
 This is done in order to improve the “explanation” of earnings and increase the “reliability” of the estimated 
coefficient of schooling. 
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3. Theory behind a static Mincer equation 
The aim of this Section is to present the theoretical foundations of the standard static Mincer 
equation, following Heckman and Todd (2003). In Section 4, I will discuss the assumptions 
needed for the transition from a static to a dynamic model.  
Mincer (1974) argues that observed earnings are a function of potential earnings net of human 
capital investment costs, and potential earnings depend on investments in previous period. If 
we denote potential earnings at time t as tE , we can assume that, in each period t, an 
individual invests in human capital a share tk  of his/her potential earnings with a return of tr . 
Therefore we have that: 
 
(2) )kr1(EE ttt1t +=+  
 
which, after repeated substitution, becomes: 
 
(3) ∏−
=
+=
1t
0j
0jjt E)kr1(E . 
 
Taking logarithms, we get the following expression: 
 
(4) ∑
−
=
++=
1t
0j
jj0t )kr1ln(ElnEln . 
 
If we define schooling as the number s of years spent in full-time investment, i.e. 
1k...k 1s0 === −  (we assume that schooling starts at the beginning of the life), we assume 
that the return to schooling is constant over time, i.e. β===
−1s0 r...r , and we assume that the 
return to post-schooling investment is constant too, i.e. λ===
−1ts r...r , then we can write (4) 
in the following way: 
 
(5) ∑
−
=
λ++β++=
1t
sj
j0t )k1ln()1ln(sElnEln , 
 
which yields to: 
 
(6) ∑
−
=
λ+β+≈
1t
sj
j0t ksElnEln . 
 
for small beta, lambda and key. 
In order to build up a link between potential earnings and labor market experience z, Mincer 
(1974) further assumes that post-schooling investment linearly decreases over time, that is: 
 
(7) 





−η=+ T
z1k zs  
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where 0stz ≥−= , T is the length of working life (independent of s) and η  is between 0 and 
1. Therefore, we can re-arrange expression (6) and get: 
 
(8) 20t zT2zT2sElnEln 



 ηλ
−




 ηλ
+ηλ+β+ηλ−≈ . 
 
However, we are interested in potential earnings net of investment costs, which are given by: 
 
(9) 20t zT2zTT2sElnT
z1Eln 




 ηλ
−




 η
+
ηλ
+ηλ+β+η−ηλ−≈





−η− . 
 
Finally, assuming that observed earnings are equal to potential earnings net of investment 
costs, i.e.: 
 
(10) 





−η−=
T
z1Elnwln tt , 
 
and using expression (9), we obtain an expression that is very closed to the standard Mincer 
equation: 
 
(11) 20t zT2zTT2sElnwln 



 ηλ
−




 η
+
ηλ
+ηλ+β+η−ηλ−≈  
 
or 
 
(12) 2t zzswln φ+δ+β+α≈ , 
 
where η−ηλ−=α 0Eln , TT2
η
+
ηλ
+ηλ=δ  and 
T2
ηλ
−=φ .  
 
Hence, after inserting an error term, we get the standard model (1). 
To conclude this Section, it is worth noticing that the total return to schooling in model (12) is 
given by the following expression: 
 
(13) β≈
∂
∂
=
∂
∂ +
s
wln
s
wln zst
. 
 
Expression (13) implicitly assumes that the total return to schooling is constant over the 
working life since it is always equal to β  for every value of labor-market experience z from 0 
to T. In addition, the total return is clearly independent of bargaining issues, which are left 
outside of the classic construction of the static Mincer equation. 
 
4. From a static to a dynamic model 
Several authors have argued, in several ways, that model (1) is too parsimonious and that 
there is a need of inserting additional regressors, in order to improve the “explanation” of 
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earnings and get a more “reliable” estimate of the coefficient of schooling. Therefore, model 
(1) has been modified in the following way: 
 
(14)    tNN22112t ...zzswln ε+ωτ+ωτ+ωτ+φ+δ+β+α=  
 
where variables ω  are new explanatory variables, such as sectors of activity, firm size, firm 
age, bargaining regimes, seniority, and so on (see Martins and Pereira, 2004b, p. 526). 
However, the choice of the variables to be added to model (1) is quite controversial and, more 
important, the estimated coefficient of schooling seems to be dependent on researcher’s 
choice of ω  variables. From an empirical point of view, the transition from a static to a 
dynamic model mainly involves recognizing that earnings have auto-regressive nature and 
then assuming that N21 ,...,, ωωω  (which should be used to improve the “explanation” of 
twln ) can be fully replaced by 1twln −  (our reasoning can be extended to more than one lag 
of earnings).  
However, there is also a more elegant way to go from a static to a dynamic model. It consists 
of modifying Mincer’s assumption (10) such that current observed earnings are a weighted 
average of past observed earnings and current potential earnings net of investment costs. Then 
equation (10) becomes: 
 
(15)   1ttt wln)1(T
z1Elnwln
−
ρ−+











−η−ρ=  .  
 
Expression (15) can be derived as the exact solution of a Nash-bargaining maximization 
problem, once we assume that:  
• the employee maximizes earnings growth, namely 1ttt wlnwlnU −−= ,  
• potential earnings net of investment costs are equal to actual productivity, 
• the employer maximizes profits, namely ttt wlnT
z1ElnV −











−η−= .  
Under these assumptions, we have the following standard Nash-bargaining maximization 
problem2: 
 
(16) 
t
tt
wln
Vln)1(Ulnmax ρ−+ρ
 
 
where ρ  is the bargaining power of the employee between 0 and 1, ρ−1  is the bargaining 
power of the employer, while (15) is the solution of (16) as shown in Appendix A. 
If we use expression (9) to replace net potential earnings in equation (15), we get: 
 
(17)  ( )21tt zzswln)1(wln φ+δ+β+αρ+ρ−≈ −  
 
or 
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 I assume that tU and tV  are net gains, i.e. the outside options are 0U = and 0V = . 
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(18) 21tt zzswln)1(wln ρφ+ρδ+ρβ+ρα+ρ−≈ −      
 
It is worth noticing that, if we set 1=ρ  (i.e. the employee has full bargaining power), then 
expression (18) becomes (12).  
A particular feature of model (18) is the possibility to draw the pattern of the total return to 
schooling over the working life, if numerical expressions for β  and ρ are available. As 
assumed in Section 3, an individual stops schooling at time 1s −  (i.e. after s years, beginning 
from year 0), starts working at a time s and receives an hourly wage equal to sw . Particularly, 
a new labor-market entrant maximizes wlnwlnU ss −= , where wln  is the logarithm of the 
minimum hourly wage3, set by law. Therefore, at time s, expression (15) becomes: 
 
(19) ( ) wln)1(Elnwln ss ρ−+η−ρ= . 
 
This involves that model (18), at time s, can be written as follows: 
 
(20) 2s )0()0(swln)1(wln ρφ+ρδ+ρβ+ρ−+ρα≈  
 
and the return to schooling at time s is given by: 
 
(21) ρβ≈
∂
∂
s
wln s
. 
under the reasonable assumption that 0
s
wln
=
∂
∂
. 
Expression (21) may be seen as the entry return to schooling, i.e. the return to schooling that 
an individual receives when enters the labor-market. It is worth noticing that it depends 
positively on the bargaining power of the new entrant as employee. In addition, (21) is lower 
than (13) except in the particular case of 1=ρ .  
 
A time 1s + , we have the following: 
 
(22) 2s1s )1()1(swln)1(wln ρφ+ρδ+ρβ+ρ−+ρα≈+  
 
and the total return to schooling is given by: 
 
(23)  ρβ+ρβρ−≈ρβ+





∂
∂
⋅ρ−≈
∂
∂ + )1(
s
wln)1(
s
wln s1s
. 
 
At time 2s + , we have the following: 
 
(24) 21s2s )2()2(swln)1(wln ρφ+ρδ+ρβ+ρ−+ρα≈ ++  
 
and the total return is given by: 
                                                
3
 The employer maximizes ( ) sss wlnElnV −η−= . 
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(25) 
[ ] ρβ+ρβρ−+ρβρ−≈ρβ+ρβ+ρβρ−ρ−≈
≈ρβ+





∂
∂
⋅ρ−≈
∂
∂ ++
)1()1()1()1(
s
wln)1(
s
wln
2
1s2s
. 
 
Therefore, at time zs + , the total return to schooling is given by: 
 
(26) ρβ++ρβρ−+ρβρ−≈ρβ+





∂
∂
⋅ρ−≈
∂
∂
−
−++
...)1()1(
s
wln)1(
s
wln 1zz1zszs
. 
 
We may call expression (26) as the dynamic total return to schooling after z years of labor-
market experience. It is worth noticing that (26) gives the static total return (13) as a particular 
case when the employee has full bargaining power ( 1=ρ ). In general, the left-hand side of 
expression (26) is z-dependent and (26) allows to draw the total return to schooling over the 
entire working life, from 0 to T years of experience.  
For a value of 1≠ρ , say ρ~ , we have the following: 
 
(27) β≈
ρ−−
βρ
≈
∂
∂ +
∞→ )~1(1
~
s
wlnlim zs
z
.  
 
Therefore, under some general conditions, a dynamic model is able to provide a measure of 
the total return to schooling which is comparable with expression (13). We may call 
expression (27) as dynamic convergent total return to schooling. Expression (27) is pretty 
important because it shows that, if 1≠ρ , a rough equivalence between a static and a dynamic 
model only holds at very high values of z. In other words, if the employee does not have full 
bargaining power, a static model does not produce an appropriate measure of the total return 
to schooling at relatively low values of labor-market experience. Finally, the lower is the ρ~  
is, the slower is the process of adjustment of the total return from its entry value to its 
convergent value, the higher the z needed for a rough equivalence.  
In general, as a simulation in Figure 1 shows, the dynamic total return to schooling may have 
a pattern, in the first part of the working life, which cannot be approximated by means of a 
constant line and a static model, if used to measure the total return of young workers, may 
produce a distorted output. A technical explanation is provided in Appendix B. 
 
5. Empirical model  
Based on expression (12) and on expression (18), I estimate the following two empirical 
models: 
 
(28) it2iiiit zzswln ε+φ+δ+β+α= θθθθ  
 
(29) it2iii1itit zzswlnwln ε+ς+χ+pi+υ+γ= θθθ−θθ  
 
where θ  goes from 0 to 1 and represents the wage distribution quantile. As model (29) is 
linear in parameters, individual unobserved heterogeneity is disregarded, and we focus “on 
the case of iid innovations in which conditioning variables play the classical role of shifting 
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the location of the conditional density of ty  [the autoregressive variable], but they have no 
effect on the conditional scale or shape” (Koenker and Xiao, 2004, p. 3), then we can apply 
the standard quantile estimation techniques due to Koenker and Bassett (1978).   
Particularly, model (29) can be written as a simple linear model: 
 
(30) iii 'xwln ε+ψ= θ  with  ( ) θθ ψ= 'xxnwlQuant iii  
 
and the lagged logarithm of earnings can be treated as any standard explanatory variable x. 
An example of this approach is provided by Koenker (2000) who applies the standard quantile 
techniques to a first-order autoregressive model for maximum daily temperatures in 
Melbourne (Australia). Another example is provided by Girma and Gorg (2002) who present 
a more sophisticated quantile regression model where the autoregressive variable is total 
factor productivity. 
Thus, the vector of parameters θψ  is estimated as: 
 
(31) ∑ θθψθ ψ−ϑ=ψ θ
i
ii )'xw(lnminargˆ  
 
and )(εϑθ is the usual check function defined as θε=εϑθ )(  when ε  is non-negative or 
ε−θ=εϑθ )1()(  when ε  is negative. The same procedure applies to model (28). 
Our discussion will continue as follows. First, I will present estimation results based on model 
(29), focusing on pi  and υ  for each decile. As expression (21) suggests, I will refer to the 
estimated pi  as entry return to schooling. Instead, the estimated υ  measures the bargaining 
power of the employer in model (18)4. If the “true” theoretical model behind regression (29) 
looks like model (18), then we should find that the estimated pi  is negatively correlated with 
the estimated υ  over the wage distribution. Afterwards, following Martins and Pereira 
(2004a), I will present decile estimates of β  in model (28), which are expected to be higher 
than estimates of pi . I will refer to the estimated β  as static total return to schooling. In 
addition, I will present estimates of the dynamic total return to schooling as provided by 
expression (26), for each decile and over the working life. Finally, I will compare the 
estimated total static return to schooling β  with the estimated dynamic convergent total return 
to schooling as provided by expression (27).  
 
6. Estimation results using data on young workers 
In my first application of model (28) and of model (29), I use data from the U.S. National 
Longitudinal Survey of Youth for the period of 1980-1987, as provided by Verbeek (2000). 
The same data-set is also used by Vella and Verbeek (1998) to study union premia. The 
sample contains 4360 annual observations on 545 young male workers. I therefore assume, a 
la Martins and Pereira, absence of participation issues typically arisen for women. Summary 
sample statistics for the selected variables are reported in Table 1. 
Disregarding - for a moment - the quantile approach, model (29) can be estimated by OLS. 
Indeed, since we assume absence of individual unobserved heterogeneity, the OLS estimator 
is consistent. We therefore present, as a benchmark, several OLS estimates. In particular, 
Table 2 shows that the entry return is almost a half of the static total return, which is 
                                                
4
 The complement to one of the estimated υ  clearly measures the bargaining power of the employee. 
 9 
consistent with (13) and (21) on a theoretical basis5 and with the stylized fact (see Martins and 
Pereira, 2004b) that addition of control-regressors (in our case, one lag of the logarithm of 
earnings) to model (28) deeply reduces the estimated coefficient of education, specially when 
the control-regressor is an education-dependent covariate (like in our case). In addition, 
Figure 3 plots the dynamic total return over the working life, starting from the entry year. It is 
increasing, at decreasing rate, during the first part of the working life; afterwards, it becomes 
roughly constant. This is a pretty interesting and new empirical result, which can only be 
obtained using a dynamic model. Finally, the dynamic convergent total return is almost equal 
to the static total return, because the average experience in the sample (6.51) is enough to 
support a static model (the dynamic total return in Figure 3 is roughly equal to its convergent 
value from roughly z = 6 onwards).     
Another interesting point, that may be briefly discussed before presenting the main empirical 
results of this paper, is about the hypothesis of absence of individual unobserved 
heterogeneity (a la Martins and Pereira). If we continue disregarding the quantile approach 
and introduce individual fixed effects in model (29), than the OLS estimator becomes 
inconsistent (based upward; see Nickell, 1981). Estimating this new model would require 
implementation of the well-known GMM techniques by Arellano and Bond (1991) or by 
Blundell and Bond (1998), that give consistent estimates. However, as the variable s (years of 
schooling) does not generally vary - for the same individual - over time6, then the quoted 
GMM techniques, based on first differences, will inevitably drop the variable of education out 
of the model, together with individual unobserved heterogeneity (which is the only required 
outcome)7. Finally, it is worth noticing that, in every model not explicitly taking individual 
fixed effects into account, the presence of a lagged value of the dependent variable as 
additional explanatory variable is likely to reduce the role of individual unobserved 
heterogeneity (adding several lags of the dependent variable as regressors may make 
unobserved heterogeneity becoming insignificant8).  
Let us now come back to a quantile approach. Figure 2 plots, over the wage distribution, the 
estimated bargaining power of the employer and the entry return to schooling (see also Table 
2). The estimated bargaining power of the employer increases till to the forth decile and 
decreases till to the ninth decile. This pattern can be explained by looking at heterogeneity of 
jobs in terms of wage, job stability, number of potential job-applicants, and so on. For 
instance, we may think that the forth decile involves the best combination of these elements 
(which gives the highest bargaining power to the employer) while the ninth involves the worst 
combination. A more interesting finding is that the estimated bargaining power of the 
employer (employee) is negatively (positively) correlated9 with the estimated entry return to 
schooling, which is consistent with model (18) on a theoretical basis. Our testing rejects the 
hypothesis of a constant entry return to schooling over the wage distribution and shows that 
this return has a flat U-shape. The returns from the third to the seventh decile are roughly 
equal but lower than those estimated for the second and the eighth decile, which are roughly 
equal and, in turn, lower than the roughly equal returns for the first and the ninth decile. 
                                                
5
 It is worth stressing that the estimate of the entry return provided by model (29) can be roughly obtained as 
product between the bargaining power of the employee implicitly estimated by model (29) and the coefficient of 
schooling estimated by model (28). This is consistent with expression (21). 
6
 This is the case in our sample. In general, interviewed individuals are those who work and stopped schooling; 
hence they are likely to declare the same years of schooling from the first to the last annual interview. 
7
 However, the quoted GMM techniques may be suitable for studying returns to education for working-students. 
8
 See Arellano (2003) for a testing procedure. 
9
 We find r = –0.781 with p-value = 0.013. 
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Figure 2 also plots the static total return and involves two comments. First, the estimated 
static total return is higher than the entry return (see also Table 2). Once again, as for the OLS 
estimation, this is consistent with our theoretical predictions and with the stylized fact that 
addition of education-dependent covariates (in our case, one lag of the logarithm of earnings) 
to model (28) deeply reduces the estimated coefficient of education. Second, the estimated 
static total return is found to increase over the wage distribution10, which is consistent with 
the main empirical result by Martins and Pereira (2004a).  
Finally, Figure 2 plots the dynamic convergent total return over the wage distribution and 
involves two further comments. First, it is clearly decreasing from the first to the seventh 
decile and a bit increasing from the seventh to the ninth. Second, it is higher than the static 
total return for lower-than-median wage groups while lower than the static one for higher-
than-median wage groups. This raises the question of why the OLS estimation gives as 
outcome that the static total return is roughly equal to the dynamic convergent total return, 
while the QR estimation does not. In our view, this is because the average experience in the 
sample is high enough to support a static model, but the average experience in several deciles 
is not high enough to do the same, and the static model produces distorted empirical results 
because a constant return is unable to account for some very big “jumps” (see the first deciles 
in Figure 3) at low values of experience. 
 
7. Estimation results using data on experienced workers 
The European Community Household Panel (ECHP) is a very large data-set containing 
micro-data for 15 countries of the European Union from 1994 to 2001. We focus on Portugal. 
To build up our sample, we start extracting Portuguese data (country 12) on personal 
identification numbers (pid), age (pd003), gender (pd004), monthly gross earnings (pi211mg), 
years of education (pt023), weekly hours of work (pe005). We repeat this operation for each 
of the eight waves of the ECHP and construct a preliminary data-set with 91437 observations. 
Afterwards we drop individuals older than 65 or younger than 15 years, drop females, drop 
individuals still at school and those not providing information about education, create a 
variable for labor-market experience (lme = pd003 – pt023 – 6), drop individuals with 
negative experience, drop individuals with zero or missing earnings. Finally, we obtain an 
unbalanced panel with 15049 observations, which is described in Table 1. 
Figure 4 plots the estimation results using techniques described in Section 5 and confirms that 
the entry return to schooling is lower than the static total return and positively associated with 
the implicitly estimated bargaining power of the employee. In addition, we find that the 
dynamic convergent return to schooling is consistent with the static total return over the wage 
distribution and when using ordinary least squares. Detailed estimation results are provided in 
Table 2. Figure 5 plots the dynamic total return for several quantiles. 
As a further confirmation, Figure 6 plots estimation results when using a sub-sample of 
Portuguese workers between the ages of 17 and 30, summarized in Table 1. Detailed 
estimation results are provided in Table 2. As expect, a static model seems to give distorted 
empirical results, even when using ordinary least squares due to a very low average 
experience (4.81). Instead, when using a sub-sample of Portuguese workers between the ages 
of 31 and 65 described in Table 1, a static model seems to perform properly. Table 2 provides 
detailed estimates. 
 
                                                
10
 This is not straightforward. However our testing shows that the ninth decile exhibits a significantly higher 
return than the first decile. 
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8. Implications of model specification and data 
Summarizing my findings, I obtain results that are consistent with those of Martins and 
Pereira (2004a) both when estimating a static model a la Martins and Pereira and when 
estimating a dynamic model with data on relatively experienced workers. However, when 
estimating a dynamic model with data on young workers, I get a different picture of the 
impact of education on within-group wage inequality. Why? We will come back to this 
question after briefly reviewing the main arguments used by Martins and Pereira (2004a) in 
order to explain their result that the return to schooling increases over the wage distribution. 
The main explanations are three: over-education, interaction between schooling and ability, 
and quality of schooling. Over-education basically refers to people with high schooling levels 
(in terms of years) who take low-paid jobs. If there are many over-educated in the first decile 
of the wage distribution, then the return to an additional year of schooling will be very low. If 
the number of over-educated decreases over the wage distribution (as the wage increases), 
then the return to education is expected to increase over the wage distribution. The same 
reasoning holds for ability or school quality. If people ability or school quality increase over 
the wage distribution, then the return to an additional year of schooling should follow the 
same pattern.   
These explanations are appealing and provide a theoretical background to understand the 
empirical result that the total return to schooling increases over the wage distribution in 15 of 
16 countries examined by Martins and Pereira (2004a), with Greece as unique exception due 
to the use of after-tax earnings (i.e. the general result is distorted because of the influence of 
taxation). In my view, however, the general empirical result that the total return to schooling 
increases over the wage distribution is not robust to the use of data on young workers. A static 
model, indeed, is based on two restrictive hypotheses: the total return to schooling is constant 
of the working-life and independent of bargaining issues11. However, a dynamic model shows 
that the total return to schooling is not constant over the working life. It becomes constant 
once a certain work-experience is matured, but it is increasing in the first part of the working 
life and, during this period, its evolution depends on bargaining issues. If a static model is 
used to estimate the total return to schooling for young workers, it may give a wrong picture 
because the photography is related to a changing situation and the static model is not able to 
account for it. Finally, it is worth stressing that the latter critique does not affect the validity 
of empirical results by Martins and Pereira (2004a), as these authors use of data on relatively 
experienced workers (around 20 years).  
To conclude, we suggest carefulness when using a static model to estimate the total return to 
schooling with data on young workers.  
 
9. Conclusions 
The paper has developed a dynamic approach to Mincer equations. I have argued that a static 
model is based on the restrictive hypotheses that the total return to schooling is constant over 
the working life and independent of bargaining issues. A dynamic approach allows to show 
that the total return to schooling of a new labor-market entrant positively depends on his/her 
bargaining power as employee; the total return increases at a decreasing rate in the first part of 
the working life and depends of bargaining issues; afterwards it becomes roughly constant and 
independent of bargaining. The main implication is that a static model may produce distorted 
empirical results when using data on young workers since not able to account for the pattern 
                                                
11
 The estimation of a static quantile Mincer equation allowing for individual fixed effects would be a further 
interesting exercise. A recent attempt of introducing individual fixed effects into a quantile regression framework 
is due to Koenker (2004). 
 12 
of the total return to schooling in the first part of the working life. I have shown the latter 
using data from the U.S. National Longitudinal Survey of Youth (1980-1987) and analyzing 
the impact of education on within-group wage inequality a la Martins and Pereira (2004a). 
However, a static model does not produce distorted empirical results when using data on 
relatively experienced workers. I have shown the latter using Portuguese data from the 
European Community Household Panel (1994-2001). 
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Appendix A 
This appendix solves problem (16), which is given by the following expression: 
(A1) 
t
tt
wln
Vln)1(Ulnmax ρ−+ρ
 
 where 1ttt wlnwlnU −−=   and  ttt wlnT
z1ElnV −











−η−= . 
It is worth noticing that our objective function comes from a standard Cobb-Douglas. We 
make a logarithmic transformation in order to make our life easier. 
Once definitions of tU  and tV  are replaced in expression (A1), we get: 
(A2) ( )
t
tt1tt
wln
wln
T
z1Elnln)1(wlnwlnlnmax






−











−η−⋅ρ−+−⋅ρ
−
. 
The maximization problem in (A2) implies the following first-order condition: 
(A3) 0)1(
wln
T
z1Eln
1)1()1(
wlnwln
1
tt
1tt
=−⋅
−











−η−
⋅ρ−++⋅
−
⋅ρ
−
. 
After adjusting (A3), we come up with the following expression: 
(A4) 
tt
1tt wln
T
z1Eln
1
wlnwln
−











−η−
ρ−
=
−
ρ
−
 
which, in turn, gives: 
(A5) ( )1tttt wlnwln)1(wlnT
z1Eln
−
−⋅ρ−=






−











−η−⋅ρ . 
Therefore, we obtain the following equation: 
(A6) 1tttt wln)1(wln)1(wlnT
z1Eln
−
ρ−−ρ−=ρ−











−η−ρ  
which, after further manipulation, becomes: 
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(A7) 1ttttt wln)1(wlnwlnwlnT
z1Eln
−
ρ−−ρ−=ρ−
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
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

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or  
(A8) 1ttt wln)1(wlnT
z1Eln
−
ρ−−=











−η−ρ . 
Finally, we get expression (15) in the main text, i.e.: 
(A9)  t1tt wlnwln)1(T
z1Eln =ρ−+











−η−ρ
−
. 
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Appendix B  
As shown in the main text, expression (26) gives the dynamic total return to schooling, that is: 
 
(B1) ρβ+ρβρ−++ρβρ−+ρβρ−≈ρβ+





∂
∂
⋅ρ−≈
∂
∂
−
−++ )1(...)1()1(
s
wln)1(
s
wln 1zz1zszs
 
 
or 
 
(B2) [ ] )z()1()1(...)1(1
s
wln z1zzs Λρβ≈ρ−+ρ−++ρ−+ρβ≈
∂
∂
−+
 . 
 
Therefore, a general static model is given by the following expression: 
 
(B3) 2zs zzs)z(wln φ+δ+Λρβ+α≈+ . 
 
Expression (B3) is equivalent to model (12) only if  
 
(B4) 
ρ
≈Λ 1)z(  . 
 
However, expression (B4) only holds as z tends to infinity since: 
 
(B5) 
ρ
≈Λ
∞→
1)z(lim
z
 . 
 
In general, we may define a function )z(ι  providing the difference between )z(Λ  and its 
convergent value 
ρ
1
, that is: 
 
(B6) )z(1)z( Λ−
ρ
=ι . 
 
Then, using (B6), we may write expression (B3) as follows: 
 
(B7) s)z(zzswln 2zs ρβι−φ+δ+β+α≈+  . 
 
Finally, expression (B7) allows to show that both OLS and QR estimation of the empirical 
static model (28) are more likely to produce biased empirical results at low z levels. Indeed, 
we may notice that the assumptions: 
 
(B8) ( ) 0s,zExpect zs =ε +   (OLS) 
 
and  
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(B9) ( ) 0s,zQuant zs =ε +   (QR) 
 
are more likely to be violated at low z levels since )z(ι is more likely to be significantly 
different from zero.  
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Table 1 
 
United States: NLSY (1980-1987) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of hourly wage 4360 1.64 0.53 –3.57 4.05 
Years of schooling 4360 11.76 1.74 3.00 16.00 
Experience  4360 6.51 2.82 0.00 18.00 
Age 4360 24.28 2.77 17.00 30.00 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Portugal: ECHP (1994-2001) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of hourly wage 13717 6.44 0.54 2.49 9.28 
Years of schooling 16263 15.59 5.69 9.00 57.00 
Experience  16263 16.87 11.86 0.00 49.00 
Age 16263 38.47 11.52 17.00 65.00 
Full sample: 17-65 
 
 
Portugal: ECHP (1994-2001) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of hourly wage 4356 6.22 0.39 2.49 8.78 
Years of schooling 4934 14.47 2.66 9.00 24.00 
Experience  4934 4.81 3.49 0.00 14.00 
Age 4934 25.29 3.10 17.00 30.00 
Restricted sample: 17-30 
 
 
Portugal: ECHP (1994-2001) 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Logarithm of hourly wage 9361 6.54 0.57 3.01 9.28 
Years of schooling 11329 16.08 6.52 9.00 57.00 
Experience  11329 22.13 10.28 0.00 49.00 
Age 11329 44.21 8.81 31.00 65.00 
Restricted sample: 31-65
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Table 2 
 
United States: NLSY (1980-1987) 
Distribution 
decile 
Bargaining 
power of the 
employer 
Entry 
return 
Static 
total 
return 
Dynamic 
convergent 
total return 
 
0.1 0.7591 0.0404 0.0884 0.1677 
0.2 0.8036 0.0292 0.0954 0.1486 
0.3 0.8201 0.0220 0.0954 0.1222 
0.4 0.8231 0.0214 0.1004 0.1209 
0.5 0.7911 0.0216 0.1036 0.1033 
0.6 0.7660 0.0219 0.1066 0.0935 
0.7 0.7017 0.0224 0.1070 0.0750 
0.8 0.6298 0.0326 0.1058 0.0880 
0.9 0.4789 0.0511 0.1072 0.0980 
OLS 0.5786 0.0447 0.1021 0.1061 
Age 17-30 17-30 17-30 17-30 
 
All estimated coefficients are significant at 1% level 
 
 
 
Portugal: ECHP (1994-2001) 
Distribution 
quantile 
Bargaining 
power of the 
employer 
Entry return Static total return Dynamic 
convergent 
total return 
0.05 0.8253 0.7166 0.8523 0.0024 0.0181 0.0030 0.0127 0.0442 0.0084 0.0137 0.0638 0.0203 
0.15 0.9188 0.8571 0.9271 0.0011 0.0080 0.0011 0.0174 0.0575 0.0119 0.0135 0.0559 0.0151 
0.25 0.9696 0.9177 0.9803 0.0008 0.0037 0.0006 0.0239 0.0617 0.0174 0.0263 0.0449 0.0305 
0.35 0.9702 0.9165 0.9791 0.0009 0.0041 0.0007 0.0347 0.0664 0.0266 0.0302 0.0491 0.0335 
0.45 0.9655 0.8914 0.9732 0.0013 0.0040 0.0011 0.0426 0.0654 0.0366 0.0376 0.0368 0.0410 
0.55 0.9498 0.8712 0.9600 0.0023 0.0060 0.0022 0.0556 0.0719 0.0500 0.0458 0.0465 0.0550 
0.65 0.9324 0.8500 0.9443 0.0033 0.0077 0.0027 0.0671 0.0805 0.0617 0.0488 0.0513 0.0485 
0.75 0.9125 0.8094 0.9265 0.0049 0.0098 0.0040 0.0787 0.0882 0.0746 0.0560 0.0514 0.0544 
0.85 0.8800 0.7640 0.8993 0.0086 0.0147 0.0067 0.0893 0.0963 0.0848 0.0716 0.0622 0.0665 
0.95 0.8085 0.6449 0.8349 0.0171 0.0288 0.0134 0.0993 0.1008 0.0956 0.0892 0.0811 0.0812 
OLS 0.8873 0.7567 0.9097 0.0047 0.0133 0.0036 0.0450 0.0763 0.0383 0.0419 0.0546 0.0399 
Age 17-65 17-30 31-65 17-65 17-30 31-65 17-65 17-30 31-65 17-65 17-30 31-65 
 
Significant at 5% level     Significant at 10% level   Non-significant  
Remaining estimated coefficients are significant at 1% level  
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Figure 1 
 
Simulation based on 10.0=β  and 20.0=ρ  
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Figure 2 
 
United States: NLSY (1980-1987) 
Age: 17-30 
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Figure 3 
 
United States: NLSY (1980-1987) 
Age: 17-30 
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Figure 4 
 
Portugal: ECHP (1994-2001) 
Age: 17-65 
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Figure 5 
 
Portugal: ECHP (1994-2001) 
Age: 17-65 
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Figure 6 
 
Portugal: ECHP (1994-2001) 
Age: 17-30 
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Portugal: ECHP (1994-2001) 
Age: 31-65 
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